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is Brazil’s shaming of the US for its opposition to the 
2001 revision of the WTO’s regime of intellectual  
property protection with regard to essential drugs 
(Daßler et al., 2019). In yet another set of cases,  
challengers engage in strategic cooptation, making 
material promises in order to buy the defenders’  
agreement to institutional adjustments that upgrade 
their common interests. For instance, in 2008 India 
offered to accept International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards in return for de facto recognition as a  
nuclear power under the nuclear non-proliferation  
regime (Kruck and Zangl, 2019). Finally, emerging  
and established powers sometimes challenge the  
institutional status quo through principled persuasion, 
arguing that adjustments will lead to improved le giti-
macy or efficiency of the institution to convince de-
fenders that they have a joint interest in institutional 
adjustments. The US tried to convince NATO partners 
to increase their military spending to a level of 2.0% 
of their GDP for the benefit of the organization as a 
whole. 
Traditional power transition theories (PTTs; see e.g. 
Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; Organski, 1968), as well 
as more recent power shift theories (PSTs; see e.g. 
Lipscy, 2017; Paul, 2016; Schweller and Pu, 2011)  
largely ignore this variation. They simply assume  
that challengers of existing institutions always resort 
to power bargaining. They claim, for instance, that 
challengers’ ability to issue credible threats, their  
options outside of the institution in question and the 
support they receive from (regional) allies are crucial 
conditions for institutional adjustment. However, the 
same conditions are less relevant if a challenger seeks 
institutional adjustments through rhetorical coercion, 
Starting Point and Research Objectives
The Research Group “Power Shifts and Institutional 
Change”, which was hosted and funded by the CAS  
in the academic year 2018/19 and whose results will 
be published in a 2020 special issue of Global Policy, 
studies how international institutions adjust to a  
changing distribution of power among their members. 
Shifts in the global distribution of power put the  
international order and its underpinning institutions  
under the pressure to adjust. As powers such as China  
and India rise and powers such as the US or the UK  
de cline, international institutions such as the United  
Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Trade  
Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) come under the pressure to adapt their 
policies or procedures to new power realities. This 
pressure can stem from both emerging and estab-
lished powers. 
In contrast to existing International Relations research 
on power shifts, the CAS Research Group recognizes 
that the strategies through which challengers – be 
they emerging or established powers – try to bring 
about institutional adaptation to global power shifts 
vary. In some cases, challengers engage in power  
bargaining, issuing threats to force defenders of the 
institutional status quo to compromise. For example, 
in 2012 China threatened to disengage from the  
IMF’s efforts of financial crisis containment to make 
the US agree on more even-handed IMF surveillance 
(Zangl et al., 2016). In other cases, emerging or  
established powers engage in rhetorical coercion, 
using arguments that target existing institutions’  
lack of legitimacy in order to shame defenders of the 
status quo into accepting adjustments. An example  
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strategic cooptation or principled persuasion. There-
fore, an adequate understanding of institutional 
change in the wake of global power shifts should take 
differences in challengers’ strategies into account. To 
contribute to a better understanding of institutional 
adjustments of this kind, the CAS Research Group 
asks three questions: What strategies are used by  
challengers of the institutional status quo to push  
defenders to accept institutional adjustments? What 
are the conditions under which challengers opt for  
a particular strategy? And what are the strategies 
through which challengers are most likely to achieve 
institutional adaptation?  
To provide answers to these questions the CAS Re-
search Group brings together scholars with a strong 
record of research on institutional change. The under-
lying rationale is that power-focused analysis of in-
stitutional adjustment to global power shifts could  
benefit from more general insights into processes of 
institutional change in international institutions. The 
common assumption of all members of the research 
group is that power shifts often create an impetus for 
institutional adjustment, but they do not automatically 
lead to institutional adaptation. In other words, insti-
tutional adjustments are not a mere reflection of shifts 
in the overall global distribution of power. Moreover, 
the members of the CAS Research Group bring in  
expertise on a wide variety of different international 
institutions ranging from the realms of security (Martin 
Binder & Monika Heupel) to the economy (Lora Viola) 
and the environment (Alexander Thompson). They 
also cover historical eras ranging from the 19th (Stacie 
Goddard) and early 20th (Paul MacDonald) to the late 
20th and early 21st centuries (Duncan Snidal & Felicity 
Vabulas, Matthew & Kathrin Stephen, Phillip Lipscy). 
Finally, the members of the CAS Research Group draw 
on a variety of both qualitative (Orfeo Fioretos) and 
quantitative methods (Jonas Tallberg & Soetkin Ver-
haegen). 
Contribution 1: What strategies do challengers use?
What strategies are used by challengers of the institu-
tional status quo – be they emerging or established 
powers – to push defenders to accept institutional  
adjustments? Contrary to the assumptions of most 
existing PTTs and PSTs, the CAS Research Group 
shows that, besides power bargaining, challengers  
of the institutional status quo may also engage in  
rhetorical coercion, strategic cooptation or principled 
persuasion. To conceptualize these strategies, we 
draw on two distinctions, the one from the literatures 
on international negotiations in general and the other 
on negotiated institutional change more specifically: 
(1) We distinguish between arguing and bargaining  
as negotiation strategies. Negotiating parties who 
adopt an arguing strategy direct their efforts towards 
convincing others of the legitimacy of their own posi-
tion and the lack of legitimacy of their opponents’  
position. The parties may use arguments to persuade 
directly one another, thereby changing their respective 
positions, but they may also argue in order to convince 
critical audiences to change their views so that they can 
garner their support. By contrast, parties who adopt  
a bargaining strategy rely on threats or promises. By 
issuing threats and making promises, they try to iden-
tify the zone where their respective interests overlap, 
while at the same time forcing one another to accept 
an agreement that best serves each of their respective 
self-interests. In real-world negotiations, the parties may 
use a mix of bargaining and arguing. Nonetheless, their 
strategies can usually be classified as having their focus 
on either the one or the other. 
(2) We also distinguish between distributive and  
integrative negotiation strategies. When making use of 
a distributive strategy, each negotiating party seeks to 
maximize its own interest through ‘value-claiming’ be-
havior, i.e. they seek to get as big a piece of the pie as 
possible. They primarily try to inflict costs on their 
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counter-party to force the latter to give in. In integrative 
strategies the negotiating parties seek to maximize 
their common interests through ‘value-creating’ be-
hav ior, i.e. they seek to make the shared pie as large as 
possible. They primarily point to potential benefits in 
order to nudge one another into a mutually beneficial 
agreement. Real-world negotiations often evolve as a 
blend between distributive and integrative strategies: 
some concern for joint gains may also figure in dis-
tributive strategies, and distributional concerns are 
often present in integrative strategies. Nevertheless, 
negotiating parties’ strategies can be classified as pre­
dominantly distributive (inflicting costs) or integrative 
(promising benefits).
Crossing the two distinctions, we arrive at four strate-
gies on which challengers may draw to pursue institu-
tional adjustments in the face of global power shifts: 
power bargaining, rhetorical coercion, strategic coop-
tation and principled persuasion (see Table 1).
 
Table 1: Strategies of Institutional Adjustment
blocked by emerging powers. Matthew Stephen and 
Kathrin Stephen describe how China relied on strategic 
cooptation when it tried to buy itself observer status in 
the exclusive club of the Arctic Council by promising 
material support in return for the privilege of observer 
status. Martin Binder and Monika Heupel argue that, 
in the early 2000s, the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, and 
Japan) used rhetorical coercion to gain permanent seats 
in the UNSC, arguing that withholding them would 
disregard their contributions to the Security Council 
and compromise its performance. And Paul MacDonald 
demonstrates that at the Hague Conferences in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, proponents of the 
codification of certain norms of war used principled 
persuasion to convince skeptical delegations that their 
proposed changes would correspond to the shared 
normative beliefs of all ‘civilized’ members of the  
‘international society’.
The analyses grown out of this CAS Research Group 
also underscore that these strategies are not only  





   










The work of the CAS Research Group shows that  
challengers of the institutional quo not only draw on 
power bargaining strategies to make defenders accept 
institutional adjustments, but also use strategies of 
rhetorical coercion, strategic cooptation and principled 
persuasion too. For example, Lora Viola finds that  
the US, facing hegemonic decline, increasingly uses 
‘exclusive multilateral institutions’ such as the G7 as 
leverage in power bargaining to impose institutional 
adjustments on ‘inclusive multilateral institutions’  
powers (such as the US) that challenge the 
institutional status quo in the wake of global 
power shifts. Moreover, several contributions 
indicate that different strategies are often 
used in combination, either simultaneously or 
sequentially. 
Contribution 2: When do challengers use which 
strategy? 
What are the conditions shaping challengers’ choice  
of a particular strategy? When do they opt for power 
bargaining, strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion or 
principled persuasion? The work of the CAS Research 
Group indicates that challengers make these choices 
as bounded rational actors. While their expectations 
will hardly ever be entirely accurate, challengers will 
usually opt for the strategy that seems – according to 
4 CAS CONCEPTS
Nummer 11 / 2020Power Shifts and Institutional Change: How do International Institutions Adjust? 
Andreas Kruck and Bernhard Zangl
their expectations – to offer the best prospects for 
achieving the demanded institutional adaptations. 
From this perspective, the CAS Research Group  
identifies two conditions of utmost importance for 
challengers’ choice of strategy: 
(1) The choice of strategy is shaped by a challenger’s 
outlook as revisionist or reformist power and thus the 
degree of alignment or misalignment with defenders’ 
interests. Revisionist powers seek major adjustments 
to fundamental principles of existing institutions or 
even aim to alter their social purpose; reformist powers 
are basically in line with the principles and purpose of 
existing institutions and merely seek relatively minor 
institutional adjustments. Therefore, challengers with 
revisionist ambitions are likely to draw on distributive 
strategies such as power bargaining or rhetorical co-
ercion. As their interests fundamentally diverge from 
those of the defenders of the status quo, institutional 
adaptation through integrative strategies such as  
strategic cooptation or principled persuasion seems 
almost impossible. By contrast, reformist challengers 
can be expected to opt for integrative strategies such 
as strategic cooptation or principled persuasion. As 
they have more common ground with the defenders, 
the distributive strategies of power bargaining or  
rhetorical coercion may well be unnecessary or even 
counterproductive. Accordingly, Orfeo Fioretos finds 
that developing countries’ revisionist ambitions in the 
1970s led them to engage in rhetorical coercion in 
their (ultimately failed) attempt to force established 
developed countries to accept a New International 
Economic Order. The same developing countries later 
turned to cooptation tactics as their demands for  
institutional adjustment of the global economic order 
became more reformist. Similarly, Paul MacDonald 
shows that challengers at the Hague Conferences  
relied on principled persuasion when their issue- 
specific interests were largely in alignment with de-
fenders’ interests, but turned to rhetorical coercion 
when these interests diverged more fundamentally.
(2) The choice of strategy is also contingent on  
whether challengers possess soft power resources  
in addition to their hard power. Hard power stems 
from a challenger’s material resources such as a 
strong economy or a capable military. Soft power  
derives from the challenger’s authority among rele-
vant audiences and its ability to make arguments that 
convince these audiences. The CAS Research Group 
finds that challengers that cannot combine their hard 
power with relevant soft power resources will be  
un able to engage in rhetorical coercion or principled 
persuasion. They will rely on power bargaining or 
strategic cooptation. However, if the challenger has 
soft power resources available as well, it will be able 
to seek institutional adjustment through rhetorical  
coercion or principled persuasion. Matthew Stephen 
and Kathrin Stephen suggest that, due to its limited 
soft power, China turned primarily to strategic co-
optation to gain observer status in the Arctic Council. 
By contrast, Stacie Goddard demonstrates that in  
the late 19th century Japan relied on its soft power  
to pursue adjustments to the ‘unequal treaties’ with 
Western powers through a combination of principled 
persuasion and rhetorical coercion.
Contribution 3: Which strategies help challengers  
to succeed? 
What are the strategies through which challengers  
are most likely to achieve institutional adaptation?  
Traditional PTT as well as more recent PST contribu-
tions suggest that institutional adjustments can only 
be achieved through power bargaining. Research done 
by the CAS Research Group confirms that sometimes 
challengers can, by means of power bargaining, force 
defenders of the institutional status quo to accept  
institutional adjustment. However, the CAS Research 
Group also finds that challengers can achieve their 
aims through other strategies, too; the ‘success rate’ 
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of power bargaining is not even particularly good.  
In some cases, power bargaining leads only to limited 
adjustment, as Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal 
suggest with regard to BRICS’ efforts to increase  
their voice and representation in international financial 
institutions. Power bargaining can also fail outright,  
as Phillip Lipscy demonstrates in the case of Japan’s 
attempt to force the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC) to lift its ban on commercial whaling.  
Yet, power bargaining is not the only strategy with  
a mixed ‘success rate’. Strategic cooptation can be 
successful, as Alexander Thompson shows for the  
US’ and EU’s efforts to nudge emerging powers into 
accepting carbon emission reduction commitments.  
It may also result in failure, as Phillip Lipscy testifies 
in the case of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the 
UNSC. Rhetorical coercion was – as indicated by Paul 
MacDonald – successful during the first Hague Con-
fer ence in 1899, but failed to bring about institutional 
adjustment during the second in 1907. It failed again, 
as highlighted by Orfeo Fioretos, when developing 
countries pushed for a New International Economic 
Order. Finally, whereas Stacie Goddard indicates that 
principled persuasion contributed to the adjustment  
of the ‘unequal treaties’ which disregarded Japan’s  
sovereignty up to the late-19th century, Phillip Lipscy 
shows that Japan’s persuasion attempts failed to con-
vince the IWC that its 1982 ban on commercial whal-
ing was inconsistent with its constitutional principles.   
Thus, the members of the CAS Research Group do  
not find a simple relation between a particular type  
of strategy and the success or failure of an attempt  
at institutional adjustment. Nevertheless, some contri-
butions suggest that smart combinations of strategies 
relying on both carrots and sticks (i.e. distributive and 
integrative strategies) are promising: 
(1) Divide and conquer: The contributions of Lora Viola, 
Orfeo Fioretos, and also – to some extent – Felicity  
Vabulas and Duncan Snidal point to a combination of 
strategic cooptation and power bargaining which can 
be used as an effective ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. 
In a first step, challengers divide the coalition of de-
fenders by coopting some of them into their own coa li-
tion. Then, with the power of their enhanced coalition, 
they force the remaining defenders to accept their  
demands. This is how, according to Lora Viola, the US 
pushed its trade-in-services agenda in the WTO. In 
addition, this is also how, according to Orfeo Fioretos, 
the US and its allies managed to defend the Bretton 
Woods institutions against developing countries’  
demands for a New International Economic Order. 
(2) Resolve and restraint: The contributions of Stacie 
Goddard and Paul MacDonald indicate that a combina-
tion of rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion 
can be effective. Through this combination, challengers 
signal both their resolve and their restraint at the same 
time. Rhetorical coercion forces defenders to take the 
challengers’ demands seriously; principled persuasion 
reassures defenders that they can trust challengers 
will not go on asking for ever more far-reaching in sti-
tu tional reforms. This, in Stacie Goddard’s analysis, is 
why Japan was able to overcome the ‘unequal treaties’ 
in the late 19th century and become a fully sovereign 
state. 
4. Implications
A key implication of these findings is that there is  
no general answer to the question of the future of the 
international order in the wake of the current global 
power shift. Rather, the future of the international 
order is likely to differ from issue area to issue area, 
perhaps even from institution to institution. Current 
debates on how the US and other established powers 
should deal with emerging powers, most importantly 
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China, seem, therefore, to be fundamentally misplaced. 
Drawing on realist arguments, some of these analysts 
(e.g. Mearsheimer, 2014) suggest that the US needs to 
pursue the containment of China wherever possible, 
whereas others (e.g. Ikenberry, 2011), drawing on liberal 
ideas, advocate engagement with China and its in te gra-
tion into the leadership of international institutions. 
However, with their respective general recipes for how 
the US and other established powers should cope with 
the rise of China, both perspectives ignore important 
issue-area-specific differences. 
Realist containment policies may be adequate where 
China pursues institutional adjustments through the 
distributive strategies of power bargaining or rhe tori-
cal coercion. Nevertheless, containment is likely to be 
counterproductive where China seeks institutional  
adjustment through integrative strategies such as 
strategic cooptation or principled persuasion. The  
reverse might be true for liberal engagement policies. 
They may work in issue areas where China seeks in sti-
tutional change through an integrative strategy such as 
strategic cooptation or principled persuasion. However, 
they may be misplaced when China draws on dis tri bu-
tive strategies such as power bargaining or rhetorical 
coercion. The issue-area-specific strategies used by 
challengers to pursue institutional adjustment call for 
strategy-specific policy responses from the defenders of 
the institutional status quo rather than a uniform policy 
response across all issue areas. And these strategy-
specific policy responses may apply not only to chal-
lenges stemming from emerging powers such as China, 
but also to challenges from established powers such as 
the US. After all, the latter may be just as con se quen-
tial for the international order as the former. 
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